About the Issue:
ETHNIC MINORITIES

China has 56 officially-recognized ethnic groups. The dominant ethnicity is Han, which accounts for approximately 92 percent of the total population, with non-Han minorities comprising approximately 8.4 percent, or 104 million, of China’s 1.3 billion population.^[1] Ethnic minorities include Tibetan, Uyghur, Zhuang, Hui, Miao, Yi, Yao, Dai, Naxi, Mongol, Lahu, and others.

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), established in 1947 by the Communist Party of China (CPC) two years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is the first of the five largest, provincial-level autonomous regions in China.^[2] But the system of regional autonomy—with autonomous governments in areas populated by ethnic minorities—was not established until the first session of the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1954.^[3] The other four regions—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR), Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR), and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)—were established over the following two decades. ^[4]

In addition to the five provincial-level autonomous regions, there are 30 autonomous prefectures and 120 autonomous counties as well as over 1,100 ethnic townships.^[5] According to official estimates, the ethnic autonomous areas geographically account for 64 percent of China’s entire territory,^[6] while in 2007 the gross regional products of the five largest autonomous regions accounted for only approximately 7 percent of China’s gross domestic product.^[7]

The chief legislation governing the issue of regional and minority ethnic autonomy is the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy (中华人民共和国民族区域自治法, “LREA”), adopted in 1984.

“ The ethnic autonomous areas geographically account for 64 percent of China’s entire territory, while in 2007 the gross regional products of the five largest autonomous regions accounted for only approximately 7 percent of China’s gross domestic product. ”

The current Chinese approach to governing ethnic minorities aims, in theory, to address inequality and separatist tendencies by promoting economic development in autonomous regions, with “national unity taking precedence.” But in fact, civil, political, and cultural rights of ethnic minorities have been severely curtailed in the pursuit of “national unity.”^[8]

Despite comprising only 8.4 percent of the total population, ethnic minorities account for about 46 percent of those living in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.00 per day.^[9] According to the United Nations’ “2007/08 China Human Development Report,” provinces with a large percentage of ethnic minorities are frequently ranked at or near the bottom of various social indicators. These indicators— such as life expectancy, education, and GDP—demonstrate the drastic inequality between China’s ethnic minorities and Han Chinese.^[10]

Despite official rhetoric of a “harmonious society,” ethnic minorities have had limited input into the state-driven development model imposed upon them.^[11] Development models such as the Western Development Strategy (WDS)^[12] have allowed IMAR, TAR, and XUAR, along with nine other provinces, autonomous regions, and one provincial-level municipality in the west, to undergo major development campaigns, but minorities in these areas have experienced limited benefits and much disruption.^[13]

“Despite comprising only 8.4 percent of the total population, ethnic minorities account for about 46 percent of those living in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.00 per day.”

Today, repression has a particularly grave impact on Mongols in IMAR, Tibetans in TAR, and Uyghurs in XUAR. Under the guise of “development” and “security,” repression is explicitly or implicitly manifested by means of ongoing exclusion from political participation, inequitable development policies, and lack of protection of minority cultural identity.^[14] Such political, social, economic and cultural repression and exclusion resultin a range of inequalities and human rights violations that have led to widespread discontent, unrest and protest.

The Chinese government officially “guarantees the rights and freedom of all ethnic minorities to retain their traditional folkways and customs in daily life or when conducting social activities.”^[15] In modern China, the Chinese government has supported minority differences primarily in terms of “traditional folkways and customs,” and Human Rights in China (HRIC) has argued that this is merely for the sake of reaping the economic rewards of tourism.^[16] Party Secretary Wang Lequan said in October 2006, “[t]he bottom line is that cultural life is based on people having enough to eat. If people cannot eat enough, nobody can sing or dance.” Such statements have been interpreted as an indication that the government sees “minorities’ expressions of cultural identity as songs and dances, but not language, religion and education.”^[17]

1. International treaties

   China has signed onto and ratified the following international human rights instruments:

   • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
   • Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
   • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
   • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
   • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
   • Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

   China is legally bound by the provisions of these instruments, and is required to periodically report to and submit to the review of the relevant treaty-monitoring Committees created by the above treaties.

   To date, various committees have, in their reviews of China, raised concerns about China’s treatment of ethnic minorities, specifically in terms of torture, discrimination, social, economic, political and cultural rights, and with regard to children and women. These include:

   • Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
   • Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
   • Committee Against Torture (CAT)
     • HRIC parallel NGO report to the Committee Against Torture (2008)
   • Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
   • Universal Periodic Review (2009)

   “Article 7 of the UDHR: All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”

   
   In addition, in 1998 China signed, but has not yet ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As a signatory, China is bound under international law not to act in a manner that may “defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.”

   The relevant provisions of the above human rights treaties, together with other major human rights documents, provide that non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of international human rights law, and such norms apply to ethnic minorities:

   Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) , Article 2: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”

   UDHR, Article 7: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.”

   ICCPR, Article 26: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

   ICCPR , Article 27: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”

   ICESCR , Article 2(2): “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

   ICESCR, Article 13(1): “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”

   CERD : Requires state parties to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, whether based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and calls for the pursuance of a policy eliminating racial discrimination.

   CRC, Article 17(d): Requires States to “encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous….”

   CRC, Article 30: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.”

   Declaration on Minority Rights: Elaborates on a full range of minority rights and has been authoritatively interpreted as a universal minimum standard protecting minority rights in international law.^[18]

2. Domestic law

   The key domestic legislation that define the relationship between the state and ethnic minorities are the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国宪法) and the LREA.

   The Constitution

   Article 4 of the Constitution states:

   All nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity, and mutual assistance among all of China's nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.

   Article 65 provides that “minority nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation on the Standing Committee of the NPC.”

   “Article 4 of the Constitution: All nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity, and mutual assistance among all of China's nationalities.”

   
   Stipulations on the administration of ethnic autonomous regions are covered in Articles 112 – 122, including:

   Article 113: In the people's congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county, in addition to the deputies of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the administrative area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate representation. The chairmanship and vice- chairmenships of the standing committee of the people's congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall include a citizen or citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.

   Article 114: The administrative head of an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall be a citizen of the nationality, or of one of the nationalities, exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.

   Article 119: The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures.

   Article 121: In performing their functions, the organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas, in accordance with the autonomy regulations of the respective areas, employ the spoken and written language or languages in common use in the locality.

   Article 122: The state gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development. The state helps the national autonomous areas train large numbers of cadres at different levels and specialized personnel and skilled workers of different professions and trades from among the nationality or nationalities in those areas.

   Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy

   The LREA formally prohibits discrimination against and oppression of any nationalities. Several amendments have been made to the law in an attempt to address the increasing inequality between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese, with a particular focus on economic inequality. Under the LREA, responsibilities for the management of natural resources, education, health care, media, and foreign trade are delegated to local legislative organs of autonomous regions. An amendment in 2001 further clarified by implementing regulations in 2005, called for promoting sustainable development and addressing poverty in ethnic minority areas, while stressing the importance of national unity.^[19]

   A number of problems with the implementation of the LREA have been identified. The UN Committee onFirst and foremost, the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed concern about the lackabsence of a formal definition of discrimination and recommends the adoption of such a definition in accordance with CERD.^[20] Obstacles to the eradication of discrimination include poor institutional capacity; shortfalls in monitoring and evaluation; lack of transparency, accountability and judicial independence; and the absence of disaggregated data for reporting purposes.^[21] Minority participation in policy-making processes remains low, due to the priority given to “national unity” under Article 6 of the LREA and Article 114 of the Constitution. This conflict severely undermines prospects for the implementation of any form of genuine autonomy.^[22]

Ethnic minority communities in China generally lag behind their Han counterparts in access to education, health, employment opportunities, and political representation. Their ongoing marginalization in society is a source of considerable discontent, and gives rise to tensions which this year escalated into violence in XUAR and TAR.

1. Education

   Statistics show that overall levels of educational attainment for minorities are generally much lower than for Han Chinese. According to a 2000 census, 14.6 percent of minorities were illiterate compared to 8.6 percent of Han Chinese. The highest illiteracy rate was 44 percent in Tibet. The figures are even starker when one considers that China adopts a lower benchmark for measuring rural literacy: the test for rural literacy is based on a selection of 1,500 written Chinese characters compared to 2,000 for urban areas.^[23]

   “Ethnic minority communities in China generally lag behind their Han counterparts in access to education, health, employment opportunities, and political representation. ”

   
   Free education has not been realized in rural and remote areas of China, largely because responsibility for education has been left to local governments that often do not have access to sufficient funds.^[24] Local governments tend to pass on the costs of education to families in a variety of “hidden costs,” rendering basic education inaccessible for many low income families, particularly ethnic minorities.^[25]

   The number of persons with tertiary education from ethnic minorities also remains minimal, though China has recently adopted positive measures involving lower admissions requirements and fees, as well as scholarships for minorities.^[26]

   Systemic problems with bilingual education policies also contribute to educational inequality. In most ethnic minority regions, the language of instruction in primary schools is the language of the minority. However, this is replaced in secondary school by Mandarin. High drop-out rates for minority students after primary school have been attributed in part to their difficulties in switching to Mandarin.^[27]

   In other cases, minorities are denied the use of their own language altogether. This not only deepens feelings of cultural inferiority, but is a violation of international human rights obligations. A similar violation is the widespread denial of education concerning minority culture and history in favor of the state-sponsored “patriotic” version of education.^[28]

2. Health Services

   A 2005 review by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights observed a marked decline in health services in China, resulting from reduced government health spending and the dismantling of the public health system.^[29] In 2005 only 4.8 percent of villages were covered by public health guarantees, compared to 90 percent in the 1970s.^[30] As there is no social safety net, the poor bear the brunt of these policies, and frequently the poorest villages are minority communities.

   “According to a 2000 census, 14.6 percent of minorities were illiterate compared to 8.6 percent of Han Chinese. The highest illiteracy rate was 44 percent in Tibet. ”

   
   Prohibitive costs, as well as the remote geographical location of villages, have put medical treatment beyond the reach of many, in what has been termed a “growing health crisis in China's minority areas.”^[31] Particular areas of concern are high maternal mortality rates, especially in Tibet where it is six times the national rate, and the rapid spread of AIDS in minority communities lacking information on prevention and control of the disease. While ethnic minorities make up only 8.4 percent of the total Chinese population, they account for 36 percent of AIDS sufferers.^[32]

3. Employment Bias

   “In Xinjiang signs at job fairs read 'Uyghurs need not apply,' while in Tibet, employment centers display notices declaring 'Preference Given to Han Chinese (Sichuanese).'”

   
   Ethnic minorities tend to be at a severe disadvantage in the job market compared to Han Chinese.^[33] Their marginalization stems from three factors: failure to meet Mandarin fluency requirements, lack of educational qualifications (which are difficult for minorities to attain), and a tendency for employers to prefer to hire Han Chinese.^[34] In Xinjiang signs at job fairs read “Uyghurs need not apply,”^[35] while in Tibet, employment centers display notices declaring “Preference Given to Han Chinese (Sichuanese).”^[36] Subsidies for public employment services are lower in autonomous regions than in much of the rest of the country.^[37]

4. Political Participation

   Despite formal constitutional provisions concerning political participation of minorities, their representation is limited in practice to bodies in which they have no effective voice in policy-making. At the national level, ethnic minorities enjoy substantial representation (around 14 percent) only in the NPC. Despite being the state’s highest legislative authority, the NPC’s influence on policy-making falls far short of that of the CPC. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC’s Central Committee—the CPC’s highest authority—has never had a non-Han minority individual as a member.^[38]

   At the local level, minority representation tends to be greatest in local People’s Congresses. While there is some participation in the Party structure, minorities are generally relegated to lower positions. The chiefs of the Public Security Bureaus in the IMAR, TAR, and XUAR are all Han Chinese.^[39]

   The lack of a political voice has been a significant source of discontent for minority communities. For example, they have been unable to raise concerns and defend their interests in major development projects that significantly affect their lives, such as the Golmud-Lhasa Railway, East-West gas pipeline project, and Ecological Migration Project.^[40]

5. Poverty

   Social and political inequality is a root cause of endemic poverty in minority areas of China.

   258 of 592 government-designated “poverty-stricken” counties (with a per capita annual income below 668 yuan) are ethnic autonomous counties.[41] Many of these counties lack even basic infrastructure: 38.8 percent of villages in ethnic areas have no access to public roads, while 24.9 percent have no electricity.[42]

   
   

   Having been marginalized in the employment, educational and political spheres, local minorities tend to believe that the WDS, while ostensibly intended to bring economic prosperity to the poorest regions, has benefited only Han workers and companies from the wealthy eastern provinces.^[43] Low levels of political representation among minorities compound the problem, leaving their own interests undefended when major infrastructure projects are planned and implemented.^[44]

6. Tensions between the Chinese government and the Tibetan and Uyghur Populations

   Social and political inequality is an ongoing source of discontent for ethnic minorities, which in 2008 culminated in widespread protests and violence in both Tibet and XUAR. The March 2008 riots across Tibet gained international attention, in particular with regard to the heavy-handed and in many cases violent response of local law enforcement officials. The sections below address these issues in detail and in their respective contexts.

   From a broad perspective, the relationship between the Chinese government and the Tibetan and Uyghur populations has historically been tense, more so than with other minority groups. Both Tibet and XUAR cover wide geographical areas that are resource rich, including minerals (gold, chromite, lithium, copper, boron), and energy (hydroelectric and geothermal),^[45] and are inhabited by vastly different ethnic groups. Despite varying historical levels of exchange with Chinese rulers, neither region was officially part of China before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, and anti-Chinese rebellions have since occurred in both. Consequently, in these areas, the government has labeled dissent as “separatism” and a “threat to national unity.”

   The government’s response to perceived dissent by ethnic minorities is customarily rapid and harsh. Religious activity especially is viewed with mistrust, and has been heavily monitored and controlled. In the case of the Uyghur minority in XUAR, the language of terrorism and separatism has been used to crack down on Islamic activity, in the context of the “War on Terror.” In order to break the historic link between religious activity and the expression of political rights in theocratic Tibet, the Chinese government cracks down harshly on both. A substantial militarization has been observed in both Tibet and XUAR since 2001.^[46]

   Further, one report notes that because most of the large construction and resource-extraction projects are contracted to out-of-province companies, related investments and wages often don’t find their way into the local economy. As a result, the development of locally-owned businesses and local expertise tends to be sidelined. ^[47]

7. State Efforts to Address Inequality

   In recent years, the Chinese government has publicly acknowledged the existence of various social problems among ethnic minorities. The following are among the officially-reported state efforts to redress social and political inequalities.

   • According to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC), the number of officials from ethnic minorities in China rose to 2.915 million, accounting for 7.4 percent of the country's total, up 2.6 percent from 2000.^[48]
   • In 2004, the Chinese government launched a four-year national plan that aimed at extending the coverage of nine-year compulsory education to a total of 98 percent of the children in China's 410 poorest western counties by the end of 2007.^[49]
   • According to the Ministry of Finance, a budget of 7.89 billion yuan ($1.11 billion) was allocated for poverty reduction in 2008, an unspecified portion of which was supposedly used to relieve poverty among ethnic minority groups.^[50]
   • Thirteen county governments of the Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (in Chinese, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonhomous Prefecture [阿坝藏族羌族自治州]) in Sichuan have provided language classes for civil servants in order to teach the languages of the Tibetan and Qiang ethnic minorities. Tibetan and Qiang ethnic groups account for 54 percent and 18 percent, respectively, of the total population in the prefecture.^[51]
   • According to the Ministry of Education, the quota of postgraduate places for ethnic minorities was expected to increase from 3,700 in 2007 to 4,200 in 2008.^[52]

   Despite such efforts by the Chinese government, significant problems encountered by ethnic minorities persist.

1. Overview

   The Tibetan people inhabit TAR as well as areas that compose historical Tibet in the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan (Amdo and Kham). Before the establishment of the PRC, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, exercised effectively independent rule over the Tibetan people.

   The 1951 arrival of People’s Liberation Army forces in Tibet marked the beginning of the formal incorporation of Tibet into China. The Chinese government was initially circumspect in implementing nation-wide reforms in Tibet, aware of the sensitivity of the “nationalities” issue.^[53] For example, Mao Zedong declared Tibet exempt from democratic and land reform policies in the first and second Five Year Plans.^[54] Nonetheless, resentment over the Chinese occupation culminated in a violent uprising in March 1959. The rebels were no match for the military might of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and on March 17 the Dalai Lama fled to India, where he remains as the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala.

2. Deadlocked Negotiations

   In 2002 the Dalai Lama initiated formal negotiations with the Chinese government, seeking a “middle way” solution of autonomy rather than outright independence for the Tibetan people.^[55] After eight rounds of talks, the negotiations remain deadlocked. The Chinese government maintains its opposition to any form of greater autonomy for the Tibetan people, and continues to condemn the Dalai Lama as a “splittist” and the Government-in-Exile as his “clique.”^[56] According to state media reports, the only “satisfactory outcome” from the Chinese government’s point of view is for Tibet to uphold the “three adherences” enshrined in the Constitution, namely, “the CPC's leadership, the socialist path with Chinese characteristics and the regional autonomy system for ethnic minorities.”^[57]

   The protests in March 2008 and their aftermath have led Tibet to what some have described as a “turning point.” In October 2008, the Dalai Lama declared that he had “given up” on talks with China, and called a meeting of the Government-in-Exile to discuss future paths.^[58] In the Special Meeting convened in Dharamsala in November 2008, after serious consideration of a push for full independence, members of the Government-in-Exile decided to maintain the Dalai Lama’s “middle way” approach.^[59]

3. Forms of Discrimination

   Following the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Chinese government has spent billions of dollars building schools, roads and other infrastructure.^[60] However, Tibetan health, education and employment have all suffered due to the government’s disproportionate emphasis on “national unity.”^[61] Tibetan language and culture are not taught in schools, medical costs are prohibitive, and employment is preferentially given to Han people or Mandarin speakers.^[62] The lack of political representation for Tibetan people denies them the opportunity to voice dissatisfaction and effect change. Religious education is severely restricted, especially after the government introduced quotas on the numbers of resident monks and nuns at monasteries, resulting in their numbers decreasing from thousands to hundreds.^[63] The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted in its 2005 China review that children of Tibetan and other ethnic minority origins are unable to freely study and practice their own religions.^[64]

4. March 2008 Protests and Crackdown

   The Tibetan minority ethnic group is denied civil and political rights systematically and violently. In March 2008, a series of protests in the TAR and Tibetan counties led to violent crackdowns in which at least 120 Tibetans were killed, 6,500 officially arrested and countless more “disappeared.”^[65] Deaths resulted variously from police firing on groups of protesters and from the torture of those arrested, in addition to cases of suicide in the aftermath of police brutality. Further, a massive “patriotic education” campaign was carried out in affected areas, again resulting in harassment, arrests and deaths of those who protested.^[66]

   The events of March have left a deep impression on the Tibetan people. The continuing trials and sentencing of protesters, as well as unexplained disappearances of family members, continue to fuel resentment among Tibetans. In its Concluding Observations issued on November 21, 2008, the Committee Against Torture expressed its concern over the March crackdown. The Committee also expressed concern at the large number of arrested persons whose current whereabouts remain unknown. The Committee called on the Chinese government to “adopt all necessary measures to prohibit and prevent enforced disappearances, to shed light on the fate of missing persons, including Genden Choekyi Nyima, and prosecute and punish perpetrators.”^[67]

1. Background

   According to official statistics, there are approximately 8.4 million Uyghurs in China, mostly living in XUAR. This region, also known as East Turkestan, is home to large populations of ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks, as well as Han Chinese immigrants. The majority Uyghurs are an Islamic group, with a unique Uyghur language and script, who identify more closely with Central Asian people than with Han Chinese.^[68]

   It is thought that the ancestors of the Uyghurs were a nomadic group originally from what is now Mongolia that settled in the present XUAR region in the 7th century.^[69] The “Islamisation” of the area under the Karahadin kings began with the arrival of Muslims in the 9th century. As the majority of the Uyghur population converted to Islam, Kashgar gradually became known as a major cultural center for Islamic learning and the arts.^[70]

   The independent Uyghur kingdom was invaded by the Manchus in 1759, and after a series of bloody rebellions it formally became part of the Chinese Empire in 1884.^[71] From the collapse of the Manchu Empire in 1911, XUAR again enjoyed brief periods of independence as the Soviet-backed East Turkestan Republic in 1933 and 1944. In 1949, as Stalin was pushing for negotiations for a peaceful takeover of XUAR by the Chinese Communists, a plane carrying the East Turkestan representatives to Beijing for the talks crashed mysteriously. Shortly afterwards PLA forces entered Xinjiang and it was officially incorporated into the People’s Republic of China.^[72]

2. Post-PRC History

   During the tumultuous early decades of the PRC, CPC rule over XUAR was characterized by intermittent periods of promoting respect for cultural difference, and catastrophic failures at attempts to implement the policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.^[73] Large scale rebellions broke out in 1958, and from then on a steady stream of Uyghurs and Kazakhs left China to settle in Soviet Central Asia, exacerbating Sino-Soviet tensions. Uyghur language radio broadcasts from Tashkent added fuel to the fire, condemning the assimilationist policies of the CPC and the destruction of Uyghur culture and identity. The situation deteriorated to the point where the PLA announced it was ending all Cultural Revolution activities in Xinjiang in February 1967.^[74]

   In Deng Xiaoping’s reform period in the 1980s, the XUAR enjoyed a brief period of liberalization. With a greater degree of autonomy, the people of the XUAR were able to restore and rebuild mosques and carry out independent religious and economic activity.^[75] However, a 1990 insurrection by an independence group in Baren County instilled a deep-seated fear in the CPC that the area would be destabilized by separatists. The CPC’s response was to pursue an aggressive policy of economic development and Han migration to the area while simultaneously cracking down on “splittist” activities.^[76]

3. Accusations of Separatism and Terrorism

   After the events of September 11, 2001, the Chinese government shifted its approach from emphasizing that the area was “stable and prosperous,” to utilizing the language of the “War on Terror” to condemn Islamic Uyghur groups.^[77] The most recent concluding observations issued by the Committee Against Torture noted that China had been strengthening anti-terrorism legislation and international cooperation, but that the rights enshrined in the Convention Against Torture were not always respected.^[78] The Committee observed that UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1566 “require that anti-terrorist measures be carried out with full respect for, inter alia, international human rights law, including the Convention and the absolute principle of non-refoulement.”^[79]

   The UN Committee also expressed concerns raised about the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes the PRC, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The SCO officially aims to combat acts of “terrorism, separatism and extremism,” and facilitates extradition of individual suspects from member states. This is the very language of separatism that is employed not only to curtail religious and political freedoms of Xinjiang residents in China, but also has led to a significantly higher incidence of detention, Reeducation-Through-Labor, and even torture of XUAR Uyghurs. In effect, the SCO requires five other border states to facilitate the return of Uyghur refugees fleeing persecution in China as terrorists. ^[80] For example, Husein Dzhelil, despite being granted refugee status and Canadian citizenship, was extradited to China while visiting Uzbekistan in 2006. He was subjected to torture and sentenced to life imprisonment for “plotting a split of the country.” ^[81]

4. Continuing Sources of Tension

   Influx of Han Chinese
   Since the founding of the PRC, Han migration to XUAR has been encouraged on the principle that it will lead to greater assimilation of local populations and reduce separatist tendencies.^[82] However, this policy has given rise to widespread resentment over preferential treatment and employment of Han Chinese over local Uyghurs, and the view that economic development of XUAR has benefited only Han Chinese. The marked economic disadvantage of Uyghurs contributes to higher mortality rates and an overall ten-year disparity in average life expectancies compared with local Han Chinese.^[83] In addition, as with other ethnic minorities, Uyghurs lack an effective political voice, because the highest government and party representatives in the region are Han Chinese.

   Religious freedom
   

   “As Islamic beliefs are frequently equated with separatism or terrorism in XUAR, religious freedom for Uyghurs has been severely curtailed”

   
   As Islamic beliefs are frequently equated with separatism or terrorism in XUAR, religious freedom for Uyghurs has been severely curtailed. Imams receive annual training on conformity, while “non-conforming” mosques are destroyed, publications controlled and schools purged. The laity are prevented from attending services, and harassed for activities perceived as “too religious.”^[84] According to local media and 2005 Human Rights in China and Human Rights Watch estimates, thousands are imprisoned each year for “illegal religious activity.”^[85] Death sentences are handed down in hundreds of cases where such activity is interpreted as separatism.^[86]

   Abuses and Torture
   Consistent with national trends for imprisonment of ethnic minorities, Uyghurs are over-represented among those sentenced to Reeducation-Through-Labor, and among cases of torture brought to international attention.^[87] In addition, cases of government-sanctioned forced abortions (or threats of forced abortions) on Uyghur women continue to be reported, despite Uyghurs being officially exempt from the one-child policy.^[88] This trend was recently highlighted in November 2008 by the case of Guljha, a Uyghur woman who was six-and-a-half months pregnant, who escaped an imminent forced abortion only after her story gained international attention.^[89]